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FROM THE EDITORS
The question of command accountability goes to the heart of what it means to 
be a military professional. Over the last few years, several major tragic accidents 
involving USN vessels have trained a bright spotlight on this question. In “From 
Accountability to Punishment,” Michael Junge offers a careful analysis of inci-
dents of naval officers dismissed from the naval service, going back to World 
War II. He argues that a major change can be discerned in Navy practice from 
roughly the mid-1980s, when the widely acknowledged “zero defects” culture of 
today first became dominant. Over these years, the distinctions between account-
ability, responsibility, and culpability have become fatally blurred, resulting in a 
higher rate of officer firings than in the past, with debilitating consequences for 
the naval profession. Captain Michael Junge, USN, is a professor in the College 
of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval War College.
Since the nineteenth century, war gaming has played an important role in the 
professional education of military and naval officers in many countries, and it 
remains one of the key missions of the Naval War College today. The increasing 
technological sophistication of commercial war games certainly helps to explain 
their wide popular appeal, but in the context of military education technology has 
its limitations. John Curry, in “The Utility of Narrative Matrix Games: A Baltic 
Example,” makes the case for so-called matrix games designed to test human 
decision-making in relatively open-ended scenarios, with reference specifically 
to a recent NATO war game with a Baltic scenario. John Curry is a senior lecturer 
at Bath Spa University, United Kingdom.
The recent decision by the current American administration to change the 
name of U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command appears to be a 
move of some geostrategic consequence, but so far its implications remain quite 
unclear. It leaves unchanged the western boundary of the command’s area of 
responsibility—an artificial line extending from the India-Pakistan border—
rather than expanding it to include all of the Indian Ocean. It is, therefore, of 
considerable interest what the Indians themselves make of this. In “The ‘Indo’ 
in the ‘Indo-Pacific’: An Indian View,” Yogendra Kumar and Probal K. Ghosh 
provide what seems intended as an authoritative tour d’horizon of India’s view 
of the current state of maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, as 
well as various suggestions for how that cooperation can be strengthened. Their 
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treatment of China is muted, but they indicate that, while China is not pres-
ently in a position to undermine the Indian Ocean’s current maritime “system,” 
this could change in the future, and they go so far as to suggest that the region’s 
maritime states should consider establishing a regime governing use of the area’s 
ports by “extraregional” powers. Yogendra Kumar, a retired Indian ambassador, 
and Probal K. Ghosh, a former officer in the Indian Navy, both write extensively 
on maritime affairs.
As the United States steps up its confrontation with Iran with the targeted kill-
ing of Major General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, it is instructive to revisit 
our last shooting encounter with Iran, Operation EARNEST WILL, during the 
last years of the Reagan administration. Little remembered today, these efforts, 
triggered by the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers by the United States to protect 
them from Iranian strikes during the final stage of the Iran-Iraq War, constituted 
the largest American naval engagement since World War II, resulting in the de-
struction of a large fraction of Iran’s navy. In “Operation EARNEST WILL: The U.S. 
Foreign Policy behind U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf 1987–89; A Cu-
rious Case,” Andrew R. Marvin examines the strategic considerations driving the 
American decision to involve itself in the Iran-Iraq struggle, arguing (contrary to 
much conventional wisdom) that it had less to do with protecting the flow of Gulf 
oil than with preventing the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the region. 
Andrew R. Marvin is an analyst in the Department of Homeland Security and a 
former U.S. Army officer.
In another footnote to the naval history of the Cold War, Bill Streifer and 
Irek Sabitov, in “‘Improbable Allies’: The North Korean Downing of a U.S. Navy 
EC-121 and U.S.-Soviet Cooperation during the Cold War,” revisit the April 
1969 incident, on the basis of much new material, particularly interviews with 
Soviet naval personnel directly involved in it. Then as now, the leader of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was named “Kim.” Bill Streifer and Irek 
Sabitov are journalists.
In “Sir John Orde and the Trafalgar Campaign: A Failure of Information Shar-
ing,” J. Ross Dancy and Evan Wilson examine a neglected aspect of the situation 
preceding the famous victory of Nelson at Trafalgar in May 1805: the relationship 
between Admirals Nelson and Orde. The latter commanded a British squadron 
off Cádiz, which was effectively, if not technically, within Nelson’s area of op-
erations in the Mediterranean. The authors argue that Orde’s later reputation is 
undeserved, and that both he and the Admiralty made unnecessary mistakes in 
the way they managed command relationships and communication during this 
critical period. J. Ross Dancy and Evan Wilson are professors in the John B. Hat-
tendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research at the Naval War College.
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IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex. For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to 
meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead 
of time (401-841-2236).
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